150 years ago today..

Today is December 13th, a wednesday. A fairly average day, perhaps a little stressful for college students who are only halfway through finals week, but on the whole, a fairly average day. People are starting to realize that Christmas is just around the corner, and the preparations are in full flurry.

But in the fields outside of Fredericksburg and Falmouth Virginia, it was a wild mix of soldiers, artillery, and horses. The Army of the Potomac had yet another new commander in the form of Rhode Islander Ambrose Burnside, the gentleman with possibly the most famous facial hair ever, which I happen to want to copy.

Burnside's hope was to make a dash from the encampments in Northern Virginia to Fredericksburg with little notice to Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV). From Fredericksburg, he would make a dash through the wilderness and the deep tangled forest, and hopefully arrive at Richmond in short order.

This plan went very well for the first half of the plan. The Army of the Potomac (AoP) arrived at Fredericksburg while the ANV was trying to figure out exactly where Burnside was. Upon arriving at Falmouth and Fredericksburg, there was hardly anyone from the ANV on the other bank of the Rappahannock. So far, Burnside's plan was going perfectly.

However, there was a problem. The 50th New York Engineer's regiment was designated to build three pontoon boat bridges across the Rappahannock before the army arrived on the northern bank, but had received word of the job 6 days AFTER they supposed to start the work. Thus, the AoP was halted on the north bank of the river while waiting for their bridges to arrive.

Enter bad decision number one: Burnside chose to hold all of his forces on the north side of the river instead of at least allowing some of his forces to wade across the still fairly low river and drive the skeleton forces away from the city and Marie's heights beyond the town.

This would prove disastrous, in that Lee and the ANV had finally figured out where Burnside was, what he was doing, and more or less where he was going, and was now racing down the roads of Virginia to get to Fredericksburg before Burnside crossed the river.

Enter bad decision number two: When the bridges finally arrived at the Union camp, the ANV was in full force on the other side of the river,  and digging in on the low hills beyond the town. The 50th New York engineers now had to build the bridges across the river under fire instead of building them in relative quiet as could and should have been done. At any rate, the bridges were finally completed after several Union regiments were sent into town in boats to drive the Confederate sharp shooters from the opposite bank.

This action occurred on the 11th and 12th of December, with most of the AoP crossing on the 12th. Burnside's plan of action was simple, just one mad rush up the hillsides south of town, with a diversionary attack on the entrenched positions on Marie's heights. The low ridges south of town were held by Thomas J. Jackson's troops, who had given their commander a nickname well earned: "Stonewall". Further north, on Marie's heights, James Longstreet's men were dug in behind a sunken road and a literal stone wall. Despite the fact that the attacks on Longstreet were supposed to be diversionary at best, they turned into the main attack throughout the 13th.

The reason for this is that General Franklin, commanding the left wing of the AoP, pretty much dropped the ball. Instead of both of his two corps  being sent forward to the attack, only one division under George Meade made full contact with the enemy, and actually succeeded in making a small hole in Jackson's line, but due to Franklin's failure to support him, he was forced back with great losses.

This left all the initiative to the right flank of the AoP,  which was up against Longstreet and Maries heights. And not one Union soldier ever reached the Confederate lines. This was due to the fact that for almost a mile in front of Confederate lines, there was absolutely nothing there to protect the soldiers. Only one small dip in the ground ran the length of the field could offer any shelter, but aside from that, there wasn't anything to hide behind, and nowhere to run. Colonel Alexander, the commander of Longstreet's artillery, said himself, "Not even a Chicken could live on that field when we open on it."

As I said, not one Union soldier ever reached the enemy lines on Marie's heights. Nearly 14 different charges had been made throughout the day, and nothing had come of it except for a casualty list that seemed endless. Even throughout the night, Union troops, including the 4th US Infantry was pinned down in that little gully for the entire night. Much like you see on the motion picture "God's and Generals", the 20th Maine regiment was also pinned down with other elements of the 5th Corps.


In all honesty, the Battle of Fredericksburg was probably one of the worst failures and disasters that ever befell the Army of the Potomac, and nothing was gained from all the attacks made on Lee's army on the banks of the Rappahannock river in Virginia.

Probably one of the saddest things about this battle is the cemetery. This past summer, I visited the National Cemetery on the edge of the battlefield. The thing that struck me was that there were few, if any, markers with names on them. Most often, they were very small, 4 inch by 4 inch stones with a mark showing what number the stone was, and how many soldiers were buried in that grave. Most graves had 2-4 soldiers buried in it, which is probably the most tragic. Fredericksburg National Cemetery was the first one created, and so they did not have many ways of identifying the dead. As such, wives, sweethearts, or families were often unable to find their loved one. For me, this is one of the most tragic of battles, where nothing was gained for the amount of loss sustained, and then the added tragedy of not even knowing who was who after the smoke had cleared..

what a waste, what a waste..